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1) Introduction:  
For roughly forty years, implantable neurostimulation devices have been developing as 
an experimental treatment for those with drug-resistant epilepsy and several other drug-resistant 
neurological disorders including Parkinson’s Disease.i These neurostimulator implants are 
implanted intracranially to provide electrical stimulation to neural tissue. Thus, this stimulation 
regulates specific neural regions that either are being overstimulated (i.e. epilepsy) or under 
stimulated (i.e. depression).ii Open looped deep brain stimulation (DBS) devices are U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) approved for Parkinson’s disease, dystonia, severe tremor, use 
as an investigational device (humanitarian exemption) for Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
(OCD), Tourette’s Syndrome, and Major Depressive Disorder. Closed-loop DBS looks to be the 
next stage in neurostimulation treatments.  
In the early twenty-first century , the first generation of closed-loop DBS  was tested  as a 
potential therapeutic alternative for the treatment of drug-resistant epilepsy.iii These closed-loop 
devices provided the electrical stimulation of previous DBS models with the additional ability to 
regulate the amount and the frequency of stimulation given by recording the neural states of the 
patient. Said differently, these closed-loop DBS systems could record and utilize the neural states 
of a patient to influence the stimulatory behavior of the device. This change in stimulation 
pattern was an improvement over a traditionally constant stimulation patterns of open-loop DBS 
devices by providing the stimulation only when needed and simultaneously saving battery 
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power.iv If open-loop devices needed adjustment to their stimulation, then a healthcare provider 
or consult programmer would manually have to change it. Contrastingly, closed-loop DBS 
stimulation patterns were the result of a personalized algorithm within the device that interpreted 
the neural data and systematically determined when stimulation was needed.v Thus, with closed-
loop DBS, an algorithm is in control of these, and its own, regulatory behaviors. These 
algorithms have become a unique component of the devices compared to other therapeutic 
neurotechnologies. However, despite this substantial difference, closed-loop DBS devices in the 
U.S. have not been federally examined any differently for safety.  
This manuscript is concerned with how personalized algorithm-controlled devices present 
uniquely individualized risks and how these risks of severe iatrogenic harms might be unassessed 
in the traditional quantitative research method. This manuscript will argue that the inclusion of 
closed-loop in N-of-1 trials will more accurately address these risks than double blind-control 
trials. While the similarity of DBS treatment and personalized medicine has been described 
before vi and used to understand the logistical limitations of employing these devices vii, this 
paper will explore what these physiological and psychological risks may entail and how the use 
of N-of-1 trials as a research method could be used for accounting for these risks. Our hypothesis 
is based on the understanding of N-of-1 trial methods as emphasizing an individual’s 
characteristics above their statistical significance in a cohort, thus allowing each personalized 
device and personalized experience to be accounted for. This paper will not argue that closed-
loop DBS devices are unsafe per se, nor that traditional quantitative research methods are 
ineffective for assessing the overall safety of closed-loop DBS. Nor will this paper follow 
previous remarks around the challenges of DBS research and how a comparison to personalized 
medicine provides insight into the modern regulatory hurdles of the device.viii The purpose of 
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your article is to emphasize that the grounds to certify neurotechnologies may benefit from N-of-
1 inputs. Accordingly, this paper will demonstrate that due to the use of a personal algorithm in 
closed-loop DBS device, N-of-1 trials could provide a further beneficial way to research their 
treatment by collecting phenomenological data to properly inform its use. 
2) N-of-1 trials: 
 To highlight the importance of the patient’s individual characteristics with N-of-1 
treatments it is helpful to analyze it analogously through the lens of personalized medicine where 
these trials has been used frequently. Precision medicine encompasses medical practices that 
emphasize the differences between patients, in particular via their genetic material or 
psychosocial characteristics, as determining factors in their treatment.ix It has grown favor over 
the past decade with the support of the former Obama Administration to mitigate traditional 
ineffective treatment standards.x This practice of precision medicine incorporates N-of-1 trials to 
assess clinical knowledge over conventional larger cohort studies. These trials include a single 
patient as the testing platform for a treatment (n=1). As an example, but not strictly an N-of-1 
trial, comparative effectiveness research between patients has been demonstrated to assist in the 
treatment of cancers due to each tumor having a unique genetic make-up that may react 
differently to an array of pharmaceutical interventions.xi Overall, N-of-1 studies can be 
combined, if conducted with similar parameters, to include meta-analytic studies to assess the 
effectiveness of a treatment in a cost-effective manner.xii 1 While there has been a criticism of 
 
1 N-of-1 Trials could provide the opportunity for other “smaller” trials to be conducted and meta-analyzed. That is, 
large companies like NeuroPace can afford lofty and rigorous randomized control clinical trials that inherently 
prioritize the objective risks described in Section Two. N-of-1 Trials could provide an opportunity for other 
companies and institutions to research the use of these devices. This process might increase the transparency of the 
research increasing the overall safety of patients enrolled in these trials.  
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these trials as being only anecdotal, some authors noted that this quality of patient-centered trials 
is analogous to the end goal of classical research methods; practical bedside patient care.xiii  
Historically, some of the first open-loop DBS trials were N-of-1, for instance when 
targeting symptoms in the treatment of Tourette’s syndrome.xiv Within this singular context, 
testing the technology involved more than targeting quantifiable endpoints, as it focused on 
examining the patient’s intrinsic experiences. This sort of focus allowed data that would have 
otherwise been missed with randomized double-blind control trials to be collected.xv In one 
example of an N-of-1 Tourette’s trial, clinicians were able to collect non-quantifiable data which 
is not the primary endpoint of controlled double-blind trial. For instance, the patient reported 
subjective experience with the technology: “before, I was oblivious, now I am lucid and can’t 
stand being this way.”xvi This subjective data are examples of further evidence contributing to 
assessment of the technology. Specifically, it is this ability to revolve around a patient’s 
subjective characteristics that could make N-of-1 trials imperative for better understanding 
closed-loop DBS treatments. Quantitative research, such as randomized double-blind control 
trials on the other hand, does not allow per se for examination of these subjective characteristics. 
Demonstrating the limitations and criticism of randomized control trials demonstrate 
areas were N-of-1 trials can be used as a methodological tool to assess personal and qualitative 
risks. To start, in analyzing the benefits of treatment options for patients from quantitative 
research, their individualities can drastically affect a treatment’s benefits.
xviii
xvii Even analyzing the 
benefits of treatments between subgroups of patient populations, such as age and gender, has 
been shown to have treatment limitations.  As Kent and Hayward emphasized: “it is not even 
known how often the summary results of a clinical trial apply to most of the patients in the trial. 
Counterintuitively, it does not take extreme assumptions to generate conditions where the 
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summary results of a trial do not even apply to the typical patient of the trial.”xix While these 
critiques have proved the base for positions against the effective use of randomized trials and the 
insertion of other statistical alternatives, it is presented here to provide an example of the 
limitation of quantifiable methods for personalized characterizes.xx Thus as N-of-1 trials can be 
seen to be necessary over quantifiable techniques, it is important that the variables of interest are 
indeed personal in nature. That is, unless a key element of the analogy is met, namely how these 
devices are as personalized as our genome, the overall analogy is weak at best.  
To draw an analogy from genetic research again to demonstrate the element of patient 
personalization, the multitude of facets associated with genetic material are leading to 
modifications in pharmacological treatments that effectively place the patient’s unique genomic 
data at the forefront of medical analysis.xxi Thus, the collection and use of this information in the 
N-of-1 format has been crucial, because through nature and nurture genetic material and gene 
expression can vary from person to person.xxii However, closed-loop DBS devices, while 
complicated, may not seem completely analogous to our genome. This is because regardless of 
the change in biomarker, neurological disease, the stimulation type, and the kind of device 
implanted, the patients can still be grouped by their treatments. For example, a group of two-
hundred neurological patients might be broken down into group of roughly six depending on 
these criteria, however, none of these patients would be considered receiving an entirely 
personal treatment. Thus, while the groups may be small there does not seem like a single factor, 
like a patient’s genome, that is unique for each patient.  
Closed-loop DBS with the development and implementation of the personalized 
algorithm pushes these devices into a class like genomic medicine where each patient is unique. 
This is because closed-loop DBS, to some degree is metaphorically similar to a patient’s genome 
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adapting over time to the changing individual. It is important though to distinguish now that the 
personalization relation is specifically related to the programing itself and not the injury or 
physiology of the patient. This is due to the fact that in the former the closed-loop DBS system 
will adapt with the patient to optimize and create a treatment regimen tailored for them 
specifically. This has been stated elsewhere that due the complexities of the algorithm and the 
lack of commercial availability of these devices, these devices and associated algorithms “may 
need to be patient dependent.”xxiii This allows us to postulate that there are issues about how 
these devices are being quantitatively measured from a cohort of subjects with a randomized 
control trial and the need for accounting for qualitative and personal characteristics with N-of-1 
trials. However, there are specifically certain risks that can be analyzed by N-of-1 trials for 
closed-loop devices.  
3) Closed-loop deep brain stimulation and risk of iatrogenic harms:  
As seen in the introduction, closed-loop DBS devices are a modified form of open-loop 
DBS that incorporates feedback from a patient’s neural activity to create a personalized 
neurostimulatory treatment. Neuropace devices were the first commercially available devices 
and predicted epileptic seizures to provide therapeutic responses accordingly.
xxvii
xxiv This allowed 
the technology to close the loop between brain and machine since the order of causal events goes 
from the brain to the device then back to the brain. This causal circle starts at the neurological 
biomarkers called Local Field Potentials (LFPs) that have been identified and implemented via  
ECoGs and electroencephalograms (EEGs).xxv The placement and type of these biomarkers 
determine the accuracy as each presents a different level of sensitivity for separate pathological 
factors and neural markers.xxvi Similarly, the associated stimulation parameters can vary to 
regulate the neural desynchronized or pathologic states.  These regulatory and stimulatory 
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parameters are coordinated and personalized by the control algorithms of each device to allow 
the neural states that are constantly changing to be monitored in real time.xxviii This ability for an 
algorithm to gain feedback from the brain also allows the devices to receive inputs about the 
most effective waveform in which to use.xxix For example, an algorithm specifically developed 
for the countering of contrary neural stimulation has been developed.xxx This contrary 
stimulation is an associated problem and technological challenge with closed-loop DBS since the 
site being recorded for neural desynchrony may be near and affected by the stimulation of the 
device itself, thus causing false probe stimulation.   
 The risks associated with the uses of closed-loop DBS can fall into a similar spectrum of 
physiological and psychological harms. The complications from surgery include intracerebral 






xxxi With the treatment, patients have been 
reported having headaches, site pain, and dysesthesias.  These more physiological 
complications are accompanied by psychological complications including hypomania, mania, 
hypersexuality, and gambling.   Aligning with open-loop DBS, patients have been reported to 
have an increased rate of suicide as high as a 15-fold increase.  Other phenomenological 
harms are described as affecting the patient’s personality after the treatment has been successful, 
or during the treatment.xxxv There is still currently a discussion in the fields of neuroethics and 
the neurosciences trying to elucidate putative DBS postoperative phenomena on the psychology 
of patients. Whether they are purely a reactive response to stimulation,  modification of drug 
intakes,  successful alleviation of symptoms,  lesioning of devices,  or natural 
evolution of disease,xl is actively being debated.xli Such discussions call for ethical attention to 




These potential phenomenal harms raised in the above paragraph are not encompassed, 
for instance within NeuroPace’s clinical trials of closed-loop DBS.
xliii
xlii While this clinical trial 
examined cognitive flexibility, visual-spatial abilities, measures of language, and validated mood 
inventories, the phenomenological data has been collected secondarily by researchers.   
Motivated by the notion that randomized control trial research methods do not include 
accounting for the fundamental differences these devices have with their personalized algorithms 
on a patient’s individualized phenomenal experiences, the importance of utilizing N-of-1 trial 
methods can be seen. Similarly, such N-of-1 research can be produced as N-of-1 trials of closed-
loop DBS devices can practically be added to current research techniques being used in the 
current policy approval processes of the United States. 
4) The use of N-of-1 trials in the evaluation of closed-loop deep brain stimulation 
devices: 
 In 1967, the Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
was passed allowing the FDA to begin regulating and evaluating therapeutic neurotechnological 
devices.xliv This regulatory body placed objective measures on the safety and effectiveness 
standards of medical devices. In the years since, the trend in clinical studies of neurotechnologies 
has been conducted with: a large number of participants numbered, randomized treatment 
groups, and double-blind standards to demonstrate effectiveness and safety. While this classical 
research model has provided grounds for the collective safety and effectiveness of closed-loop 
DBS, it has not allowed for and analysis of how the unique psychology of each patient interacts 
with the device and its effects on their phenomenal experiences, and the risks associated with 
having a personalized algorithm running therapeutic treatments. To provide a cautionary quote 
from an FDA approval meeting on open-loop DBS in the evaluation of a stimulatory device for 
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Parkinson’s disease “unless that side effect [from DBS] slaps you in the face or is quite 
profound, you may not find subtle effects like the neurological changes.”xlv This comment 
reflects the risk of having subtle effects undetected via quantitative measurement. These effects 
might be unnoticed especially if they are subtly interfering or disrupting the unique 
psychological continuity of each patient and are resulting from interactions with the device and 
its entanglement with the phenomenal experiences.xlvi  
 As neurotechnologies are examined, they are reviewed by organizations such as the Center 
for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) and the Division of Neurological and Physical 
Medicine Devices (DNPMD). Due to their high-risk, closed-loop DBS devices are considered a 
Class III device per the CDRH’s standards. There are also several pathways to certify 
neurotechnologies such as the Premarket Approval Submission (PMA), De Novo Submission, 
Premarket Notification 510(k), or Humanitarian Device Exemption. These paths all change in 
comparison to the length of time required until certification for market place use with the PMA 
pathway taking the longest and required for new devices. The device taking any of these 
pathways largely relates to if there is another device on the market for similar safety and efficacy 
comparison. If another similar device can be found, the device will flow through the De Novo 
Submission pathway.xlvii
xlviii
 In the early 2010’s it was reported that 99% of medical devices were 
reported as taking this quicker certification pathway.  However not all pathways are equal for 
it has been argued that DBS devices, in the treatment of Obsessive-compulsive disorder, should 
follow the PMA pathway over the Humanitarian Device Exemption.  xlix, 2  
 
2  It’s important to note that the technology rather than the pathology itself may dictate which pathways to follow. 
This is crucial with closed-loop components which are not yet fully understood. For instance, closed-loop 
autonomous ability of the algorithm to control the signal will likely push regulation into the realm of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI). It is still unclear what aspects of these regulations may change if closed-loop devices are to be 
considered a form of AI. However, within the “Future of Artificial Intelligence Act of 2017” bill, the US 
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It is specifically through the PMA track that an area of N-of-1 incorporation can be 
found.  Through the PMA track the FDA will report an assessment of the device that will weigh 
the probable benefit from the risk of clinical side effects with its use. As can be seen in the 
evaluative criteria of NeuroPace, the first closed-loop DBS device was measured using this 
safety and effectiveness for these devices using data from randomized control trials.l A, 
presumably smaller, measurement of the device was also taken from patient feedback. This 
feedback included the trade-offs they might be willing to accommodate or live with for access to 
these devices.li However, we are unaware of how weighted or rigorous these assessments are in 
the approval process of the devices. If these assessments are the patient impact statements of 
these treatments, which consists of a bleak summary of a patient’s experience with their DBS 
treatment, then there is likely room for improvement.lii It is here that the utilization of N-of-1 
trials may be included to provide further insight into the patient’s experiences of the devices. 
This may include phenomenal experiences from the patients or personal narratives. Similarly, the 
number of subjects that could be examined could vary.  
 5) Articulating potential risks of harm in informed consent: 
 Overall, our article illustrates the challenges encountered by traditional double-blind 
quantitative trials concerning the phenomenological dimensions of a patient’s postoperative 
experiences after implantation with DBS. In our article, we present the idea that N-of-1 trials 
may be a better regulatory fit for evaluating safety of neurotechnologies such as closed-loop 
 
government specifically defined AI as the lack of human oversight on the regulation of stimulation. (John Delaney, 
“Text - H.R.4625 - 115th Congress (2017-2018): FUTURE of Artificial Intelligence Act of 2017,” webpage, May 
22, 2018, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4625/text.) This policy is but one aspect of the 
growing regulation and ethical assessment concerns of AI. We draw from this that closed-loop DBS devices should 
be understood as having an AI component and may fall under the risks associated with usage of AI, however, may 
not meet all the ethical and legal concerns that arise with AI technologies.   
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DBS. N-of-1 trials may simply be a better option to observe qualitative variations such as 
potential unwanted psychiatric adverse effects than double-blind trials.3 To further support this 
argument from an ethical perspective, one major area of  focus is obtaining adequate informed 
consent as it should articulate the limits and risks of novel invasive neurotechnologies. In 
particular, decisions to enroll in these trials should account for long-term psychological effects 
experienced by patients who are also experiencing improvement in their illness’s core 
symptoms.liii Identifying these potential postoperative issues can provide support to patients 
experiencing unexpected post-implantation neuropsychiatric effects,liv prepare caregivers to deal 
with potential neuropsychiatric consequences,lv educate family members about potential sudden 
behavioral changes, and generate knowledge that could guide prospective patients and their 
families through the decision-making process prior to implantation. Importantly, involving 
family in decision-making may implicitly and unrecognizably undermine autonomous consent of 
participants. As such, participant voice should ultimately prevail.  Informed consent process 
leading to N-of-1 trials should account for these realities.  
 The use of N-of-1 trials for closed-loop DBS should translate into solutions for three 
potential ethical issues.lvi (A) Patients knowing of the potential qualitative variations such as 
unwanted psychiatric adverse effects might prefer not to be implanted with closed-loop DBS 
knowing that these changes could occur postoperatively. However, should the risk be deemed 
acceptable by the patient, then (B) there may be a way to design a better decision-making 
process, involving the patient’s family/caregiver’s, in order to prepare those relevant parties for 
possible neuropsychiatric effects. Should this process lead to a fair negotiation between the 
 
3 However, it should be noted that even if our argument is current, it would not mean that closed-loop DBS devices 
are free of ethical issues when tested in an N-of-1 fashion. 
12 
 
patient and their family, then (C) all of them must consent to accepting the potential long-term 
unanticipated phenomenological consequences (Burden to Normality: from the patient 
perspective “I am symptom-free but I may become an unexpected “new” person”; from the 
family/caregivers’ perspective “We are living with a treated but unanticipated “new” person”). 
 The first issue (A) appears to be a sole and ultimate decision made by the patient that 
aims to preserve patient sovereignty within their entourage. It engages with the patient capacities 
for self-determination and autonomy. The second issue (B) involves an acceptance of the 
potential risk from at least two parties, which includes preparatory phases to help the patient and 
their family/caregivers manage possible unwanted outcomes. In some open-loop trials, some 
patients experienced postoperative drastic socioenvironmental ruptures, requiring restructuration 
of family and environmental dynamics. For instance, up to 65% of patients who were married 
(who lived with a partner) before neuro-intervention experienced a conjugal crisis after the 
operation and up to 64% of patients who were working before surgery wanted to step after.lvii 
The third issue (C) addresses the possibility of adverse outcomes experienced by the patient that 
are incompatible with their family/caregivers’ values and expectations. This raises the issues of 
the patient’s autonomy as a new person, but as well as the family as an autonomous entity, where 
the new person is not welcomed. It highlights the importance of not just resolving the conditions 
which afflict the patient but to also address non-symptoms that might impact the family dynamic 
potentially arising from the treatment. These three possible ethical issues reflect the need for 
patients and families/caregivers to face phenomenological adversities (including potential 
psychiatric side effects) that may accompany the alleviation of the patient’s symptoms. 
6) Conclusion:  
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In this paper, it has been argued that N-of-1 trials should be incorporated into the safety 
assessment of closed-loop DBS devices to accommodate for the risks that develop through use of 
a personalized algorithm. It has done so by describing closed-loop DBS devices as providing a 
unique and personalized treatment to patients due to their algorithms that N-of-1 trial will be able 
to assess because of their emphasis on personal characteristics. It then described the weakness of 
current quantitative methods to assess these characteristics and that as a result the risks of 
documented psychological and phenomenal harms that patients experience from the use of 
closed-loop DBS devices were not being adequately incorporated. This showed the importance 
of N-of-1 trials, and subsequent sections provided further support by describing that N-of-1 trials 
could possibly be utilized as patient feedback has been used in the current PMA procedures. 
Lastly, it touched one areas of ethical concern that having such N-of-1 data could impact and 
shape. This paper has, however, not answered the associated questions of to what degree N-of-1 
trials should be considered in the risk assessment of closed-loop DBS. These concerns about the 
practical use of N-of-1 studies are the topic of further research. Ultimately, this paper has argued 
for contrastingly both a wider scope in which to assess closed-loop DBS safety standards by 
incorporating other measurement standards, and at the same time a more focused scope to the 
what the patients afflicted with serious neurological diseases are experiencing with this 
treatment. 
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